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INTRODUCTION
Charter schools are becoming an increasingly important part of America's
primary and secondary education system. Since 1991, forty states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have authorized charter schools,' and more than
3000 such schools have opened.2 Congress has recently devoted considerable
time and attention to charter schools, authorizing major grant programs to
assist charter schools with startup costs3 and facility acquisition,4 and allowing
failing conventional public schools to restructure themselves as charter schools
under the No Child Left Behind Act.'
As charter schools increase in importance, so does the debate about the
laws that govern them. In this Note, I examine one aspect of that debate:
whether to organize charter schools as nonprofit or for-profit entities. The role
of profit has become a contentious issue in charter school policy. For-profit
schools have drawn criticism for cutting quality in the interests of shareholders
and overlooking the public good aspects of education. They have also drawn
praise, however, for the innovation, efficiency, and market-style discipline they
promise to bring to education.
I explore charter schools' use of the nonprofit and for-profit forms from the
perspective of agency costs theory. Though the debate about charter schools is
so broad that strong claims about its content are dangerous, voices well
informed by agency costs theory appear to have been largely absent. This Note
seeks to fill that gap.
Agency costs theory illuminates the debate about charter school
organizational form in a number of ways. First, agency costs theory explains
the relative dominance of nonprofits in the charter school market. As Henry
Hansmann has argued, the nonprofit form is useful when principals have an
unusually difficult time monitoring or enforcing contracts with their agents. By
prohibiting nonprofits from distributing earnings to shareholders, state laws
allow nonprofits to pledge with a high degree of credibility that they won't
cheat their patrons in ways the patrons can't perceive or control. Since
nonprofits don't stand to gain anything from cheating, they have little reason
to do it. Hansmann's model fits the charter school market, because the various
1. US Charter Schools, State Information, http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs-docs/
sp/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
a. See infra tbl.l.
3. 20 U.S.CA. §§ 7 221- 7 221j (West 2003).
4. Id. SS 7223-7223j.
S. Id. S 6316(b)(8)(A)-(B)(i).
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parties that control charter schools' success -parents, government agencies,
and donors- all have a great deal of difficulty perceiving and controlling abuse
and cheating by charter schools. In other words, monitoring costs are high and
the nonprofit form reduces them. A significant minority of for-profit charter
schools exists in spite of these high monitoring costs, however, because for-
profit schools' superior access to capital markets allows them to operate on a
large scale. For-profit schools exist when they can achieve economies of scale
that outweigh agency-cost inefficiencies.
Second, agency costs theory suggests that nonprofits may be better than
for-profits at furthering some of charter school policy's more complicated
goals. Nonprofit schools attract charitable donations and improve local
teachers' and parents' control more effectively than for-profits do. This
conclusion must not be overstated; for-profit schools may be slightly more
responsive to the pressures of output-based accountability than nonprofits are.
But there is little doubt that organizational form has important consequences
for charter schools' abilities to actualize the goals of charter policy.
Finally, agency costs theory suggests that regulators may need to control
for-profit schools more aggressively than nonprofit schools. The rhetoric of the
charter school movement has emphasized charter-school-specific forms of
accountability, such as parental monitoring and periodic output-based review
by government agencies. But agency costs theory suggests that the nonprofit
form may be just as important in regulating most charter schools as these more
direct forms of accountability are. For-profit schools not subject to the
nonprofit form's constraints are therefore likely to expose the gaps and cracks
in charter-school-specific regulation. In this Note, I suggest a handful of
regulatory changes to meet the challenges for-profit schools pose. These
include curtailing "hybrid" for-profit-nonprofit management arrangements,
limiting for-profit schools' ability to cut quality in imperceptible ways, and
strengthening existing governmental monitoring and information-gathering
systems.
I begin in Part I by explaining the charter school concept and the
organizational forms charter schools use. These forms tend to be complex and
cannot be placed into "nonprofit" and "for-profit" categories as neatly as forms
in most industries. In Part II, I explain nonprofit schools' relative dominance.
In Part III, I explain why nonprofits' dominance is not total, and why there are
still a significant number of for-profit charter schools. I move in Part IV to
examining how for-profit and nonprofit schools differ in achieving some of the
more complicated goals of charter school policy. In Part V I then propose
changes in regulation to meet the challenges posed by for-profit schools.
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I. CHARTER SCHOOL STRUCTURE
"Charter schools" are notoriously hard to define. Charter laws differ widely
from state to state, and charter schools exist alongside other school choice
regimes, some of which go by different names but are difficult to distinguish
from charter schools. 6 The concepts of "for-profit" and "nonprofit" are also
complicated in the charter school context. Mostly to avoid restrictions on for-
profit entities' abilities to hold charters directly, charter schools have produced
unusual fusions of for-profit and nonprofit legal forms that defy easy
categorization. To clarify these murky concepts, in Section A I define "charter
schools" and distinguish them from conventional public and private schools. In
Section B, I draw distinctions among charter schools, and separate these
schools into for-profit and nonprofit groups.
A. The Charter School Concept
Charter schools combine elements of conventional public and private
schools.7 The key characteristic of a charter school is that it combines public
funding with private management. Unlike conventional private schools,
charter schools do not charge tuition8 and receive all of their funding from state
and local governments, school districts, and private charitable donations.
Unlike conventional public schools, however, charter school teachers and
managers usually are not government employees.9 State laws place few
6. Like charter programs, voucher programs combine public funding and unsolicited private
operation. The main difference is that vouchers are more lightly regulated: Voucher schools
often do not have to pass a review process to open, and are not subject to closure or
persistent state monitoring. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 89 (Univ.
Chi. Press 1982) (1962) (comparing voucher regulation to restaurant sanitation inspections).
John Chubb and Terry Moe, two early and highly influential school choice advocates, for
example, used the term "chartered" to describe the schools in their proposal, even though
their proposal looks more like a modem voucher program than a charter program. JOHN E.
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 219 (1990).
7. The definition I offer in this Section combines observations about state laws, which enable
and directly regulate charter schools, with the formal definition of a "charter school"
established by Congress for determining federal startup grant eligibility under the Public
Charter Schools Program, 20 U.S.CA. § 7221i(1) (West 2003); U.S. DEP'T EDUC., CHARTER
SCHOOLS PROGRAM: NONREGULATORY GUIDANCE, TITLE V, PART B, at 6-7 (2004).
8. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221i(1)(F) (West 2003).
g. See id. § 722i(1)(B), (2). Under the federal definition, charter schools can, however, be
operated by public entities. Id. § 7 221i(2). When public entities operate charter schools, they
are often separate from conventional public school districts. Of course, the line between
publicly operated charter schools and conventional public schools is quite thin.
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restrictions on who can start a charter school, and the charter school definition
the U.S. Department of Education uses for administrative purposes allows
parents, teachers, school administrators, and any "members of the local
community" to operate a charter school."0
Enrollment in a charter school is also usually optional." Unlike
conventional public schools, charter schools rarely have geographic boundaries
inside which attendance is compulsory.1" Students can leave charter schools for
other charters, conventional private schools, or conventional public schools. If
a school has more students wishing to attend than seats, it must admit students
by lottery. 3
Prior to opening, a charter school must receive a "charter" from a
statutorily authorized agency.' 4 Under the federal definition, any "public
entity" authorized under state law and approved by the Secretary of Education
can authorize a charter school." In most states, charters may be granted by
local districts, state departments of education, or universities. The chartering
process and the level of scrutiny applied to charter applications vary widely
among states.
A related point is that chartering agencies rarely solicit applications. Unlike
most publicly funded, privately operated enterprises, charter schools typically
apply for public funding on their own initiative, operate largely according to
their own terms, and rarely have to endure a competitive bidding process. 6
10. Id. § 7221i(2).
ii. Id. § 7221i(1)(H).
12. Some school choice plans allow choice among conventional public schools. See, e.g., CHUBB
& MOE, supra note 6, at 2o6-15; Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Rebecca L. Gau, New Ways of
Education, 130 PUB. INTEREST 79, 86 (1998) (observing that "[t]wenty states now allow
some form of inter-district open enrollment"); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2046 (2002) ("Most public school choice plans
are intradistrict, meaning that students can choose schools within a particular district but
cannot cross district lines.").
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221i(1)(H) (West 2003).
14. Id. § 7221i(3)-(4).
15. Id. § 7221(4).
16. By capping the number of charter schools at artificially low levels, some states may create a
system functionally similar to a competitive bidding process. New York's charter law, for
example, only allows the state's Board of Regents to authorize fifty charter schools. Elissa
Gootman, In Last Call, Regents Approve 4 New Charter Schoolsfor the City, N.Y. TImEs, Jan.
10, 2006, at B6. The Board considered six applications in handing out its last four charters
under the law. Although a spokesman for the New York City Schools Chancellor said all six
applications were "worthy" of charters, only four could win. Id. In essence, the six applicants
had to compete directly for four charters. The charter application process generally only
becomes directly competitive near the top end of a cap, however, and often the caps
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When cities hire private trash collectors, for example, they usually begin by
defining the areas to be served and seeking competitive bids.17 In most cases,
after signing a contract, the city stops collecting the trash and lets the winner of
the bidding process take over. In contrast, school-chartering agencies tend to
wait passively for charter operators to come to them, and the goals of charter
schools may have little or no connection to the strategic plans of the districts in
which they operate. Charter applicants usually determine their own
"educational objectives" and basic curricula; these objectives and curricula are
merely "agreed to" by chartering agencies.'" And charter authorizers usually
grant charters to worthy applicants even when existing conventional public
schools have the capacity to educate all students in an area. This often means
that conventional schools' costs remain the same even after charter schools
appear in their areas and begin drawing away students and the funding
attached to them.19 Sometimes charter schools follow a more traditional
privatization model. Under the No Child Left Behind Act, for example, local
districts, on their own initiative, can dissolve failing conventional public
schools and convert them to or replace them with charter schools."
Under the U.S. Department of Education definition, charter schools are
"exempt from significant State or local rules that inhibit the flexible operation
and management of public schools."21 Granting charter schools greater
freedom ideally enhances their ability to innovate and operate efficiently.
Unlike conventional public schools, which the government monitors by
dictating inputs -e.g., whom to hire, what to teach, and where to teach it -
charter schools in theory are primarily regulated by the monitoring of their
output as measured by student achievement. They develop their own
educational objectives and the means for measuring them,' and government
agencies do not interfere with these decisions as long as charter schools
themselves come under fire when they prevent charter authorizers from granting charters to
worthy applicants. See, e.g., Elissa Gootman, Lines Are Drawn in Fight To Add Charter
Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2oo6, at Ai.
17. For an excellent introduction to the forms and purposes of "contracting out," see JOHN D.
DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989).
1S. 20 U.S.C.A. § 722li0l)(C) (West 2003).
19. See, e.g., UTAH FOUND., REPORT No. 66o, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CAN THEY SURVIVE IN UTAH?
17-19 (2003).
20. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(8)(A)-(B) (West 2003); U.S. Dep't of Educ., Stronger
Accountability: Questions and Answers on No Child Left Behind, What if a School Does
Not Improve?, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/schools/accountability.html#5 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006).
21. 20 U.S.C-A. 7221i(1) (A) (West 2003).
22. See id. § 7221i(l)(L).
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demonstrate success. When charter schools fail, chartering agencies or state
boards of education theoretically respond by closing the schools rather than by
dictating inputs. 3
The "output-based regulation" ideal has frequently faltered in practice.
Charters have often failed to establish meaningful and measurable goals, and
charter schools' freedom is limited by significant input-based regulation. Many
(perhaps most) charter schools must comply with state-level regulation of
curriculum and teacher qualifications. And exemptions from state laws and
regulations appear to have been rare. 4 Charter schools must also be
nonsectarian,2" and must comply with antidiscrimination, 6 auditing,"7 safety
and health,"s and other applicable state2 9 and federal laws. Nevertheless,
charter schools have often found ways to carve out room for unique curricula
and governance structures even in the face of heavy regulation.
B. Distinguishing For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools
Charter school operators have discovered a variety of innovative ways to
combine for-profit and nonprofit forms. These forms occupy a continuum,
with schools owned and operated by for-profit entities on one end and schools
owned and operated by nonprofit entities on the other. Although the charter
school literature has often failed to distinguish among these forms, a thorough
understanding of them is essential for my purposes. The place a school
occupies on the continuum will determine how accurately economic models
developed to describe more pure for-profit and nonprofit firms apply.
On the nonprofit end of the continuum are charter schools organized under
state laws as nonprofit corporations that qualify for tax exemptions under
23. The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act is bringing charter and conventional public school
monitoring regimes closer together. Under NCLB, governments are supposed to respond to
persistent failure in conventional public schools by restructuring the schools. 20 U.S.C.A. 5
6316(b)(8) (West 2003). The NCLB system differs from charter regimes in important ways,
however. First, unlike a failing charter school, a persistently failing conventional public
school is not gone forever under NCLB. It must merely be restructured with different
employees or as a charter school. Second, NCLB makes no pretenses about giving schools
greater freedom in exchange for output-based accountability.
24. See infra note 84.
25. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7 221i(1)(E) (West 2003).
26. Id. § 7221i(1)(G).
27. Id. § 722li(1)(I).
28. Id. 5 7 221i(1)(J).
29. Id. e 722ei(L)(K)a
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I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). In a pure nonprofit charter school, the nonprofit entity that
holds the school's charter manages all strategic and day-to-day operations and
directly employs all the teachers, administrators, and staff.3 Also near this end
of the continuum are nonprofit charter-holding organizations that hire
nonprofit management entities to operate their schools.' In these schools, one
nonprofit entity may receive the charter from a chartering agency, and then
hire a separate organization to actually manage the school. On the for-profit
end of the continuum are firms organized as for-profit business entities under
state law that both hold charters and manage their schools' operations. Charter
schools on the extreme for-profit end of the continuum are rare.32
The middle of the continuum is inhabited by what I will call "hybrid
schools." In a hybrid school, a nonprofit entity receives and holds the school's
charter, and contracts with a for-profit firm for management services.3
Sometimes these arrangements make genuine economic sense, with nonprofit
charter-holding entities and for-profit management firms each playing their
roles more efficiently than the other could. Often, though, these arrangements
owe their existence to state laws that prohibit for-profit entities from holding
charters directly. Since they can't hold charters themselves, for-profit entities
find or create nonprofits capable of doing it for them. Nationally,
approximately fourteen-4 to nineteen35 percent of nonprofit charter schools
contract with for-profit management firms for at least some services.
30. Also on this end of the continuum are charter schools that are legally part of the school
districts in which they operate. These arrangements appear to be rare. See, e.g., Sandra
Vergari, The Regulatory Styles of Statewide Charter School Authorizers: Arizona, Massachusetts,
and Michigan, 36 EDUC. ADMIN. Q-73o, 736 tbl.2 (2000).
31. See POLICY & PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM 32-33 (2004) [hereinafter PCSP EVALUATION].
32. Charter School Laws and Partnerships: Expanding Opportunities and Resources 4 tbl.3 (Educ.
Comm'n of the States, Policy Brief, Apr. 2004), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/5l/12/
5112.doc; see also Alex Molnar, For-Profit K-12 Education: Through the Glass Darkly (Nov.
14, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/o051114_
Molnar.pdf (arguing that for-profit firms rarely directly own either charter schools or
conventional private schools).
33. At least six states have prohibited contractual partnerships for school operation between
charter schools and for-profit management companies. Educ. Comm'n of the States, supra
note 32, at 4 tbl. 3. Many states that allow partnerships undoubtedly did not intend
partnerships to become a means of circumventing restrictions on the direct granting of
charters to for-profit schools. See, e.g., Kent Fischer, Public School Inc., ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES ONUNE, Sept. 15, 2002, http://www.sptimes.com/2oo2/o9/15/news-pf/State/Public_
School Inc.shtml (observing Florida lawmakers' surprise at the use of for-profit
management companies to circumvent the state's prohibition on direct charter grants to for-
profit corporations).
34. See infra tbl.l.
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The place a particular hybrid school occupies on the for-profit-nonprofit
continuum depends on the kinds of services the for-profit management firm
provides. Some hybrid schools hire for-profit firms only for limited logistical
services or the outlines of a curriculum, and thus fall close to the nonprofit end
of the continuum. Most hybrid schools, however, grant for-profit management
companies more substantial roles. The U.S. Department of Education found
that seventy-one percent of hybrid schools hired for-profit firms to "manag[e]
the overall operation or administration of [the] school.", 6 Sixty-four percent
had the for-profit firms direct curriculum and instruction, and sixty percent
had the firms hire staff.7 Sixty-four percent of the nonprofit charter-holding
entities in hybrid schools also received seed or startup funds from their for-
profit managers."
More detailed observation supports the story these national statistics tell of
deep involvement by for-profit firms. A report issued by Western Michigan
University found that for-profit management companies in Michigan -a state
with an unusually high percentage of for-profit schools39 - often own charter
schools' buildings, equipment, and supplies; nominate and cultivate support
for board members of the nonprofit entities that apply for charters; and
contribute startup capital. 4° In fact, some management companies in Michigan
refuse to contract for anything other than "full service" agreements that grant
them total authority over the schools. 4 ' The existence of a number of for-profit
management companies serving only one school42 suggests that the line
between nonprofit charter-holding entities and their for-profit management
companies is thin. A for-profit management firm serving only one school
would have no economies of scale to justify independence from its client,
absent legal restrictions on direct ownership by the management firm.
35. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 32.
36. Id. at 34 exhibit 3-14.
37. Id.
3e. Id.
39. JERRY HORN & GARY MIRON, THE EVALUATION CTR., W. MICH. UNIV., AN EVALUATION OF
THE MICHIGAN CHARTER SCHOOL INITIATIvE: PERFORMANCE, AccouNTABILITY, AND IMPACT
(2000). Seventy-two percent of charter schools in Michigan have some contractual
relationship with a for-profit firm. Id. at 43.
40. Id. at 47-49.
41. See id. at 47.
42. Id. at45 tbl.4 :I.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that many nonprofit entities are merely fronts for
for-profit firms.43
The place a hybrid school occupies on the continuum may also be
influenced by the way its management firm is compensated. Two basic
arrangements are possible. A management company may receive a fixed fee
(calculated per student, per school, or by some other method), and the
nonprofit hiring organization may pay all of the school's operating expenses.
Under this kind of arrangement, a for-profit firm might have relatively little to
gain from cutting costs or quality, except to the extent that overspending might
make the nonprofit charter-holding organization insolvent and eliminate the
possibility of a continuing relationship. A second possible arrangement may
grant a management company a fee and require the company to pay its
operating expenses out of that fee. In these circumstances, the for-profit
management company has much to gain by cutting costs, since it receives all of
whatever surplus remains after expenses are paid. In this kind of compensation
arrangement, the for-profit manager may be indistinguishable from an owner
who receives nearly all or most of the business' revenues and bears the requisite
level of liability and costs.
Evidence of how for-profit management firms are actually compensated is
hard to find. Its last public filing before it went private suggests that Edison
Schools, the nation's largest for-profit education management company, 44
typically receives a large fee and pays its own operating expenses out of that
fee.4 ' But it is unclear if Edison's experience is typical. Only a handful of for-
profit education management organizations are public companies subject to
filing requirements under the securities laws, so little is known about their
43. The California Charter Academy (CCA) is perhaps the highest profile example. While
facing bankruptcy and a state investigation in 2004, the nonprofit company closed sixty
schools. The investigation revealed that the chief executive of CCA also happened to be the
chief executive of the for-profit firm that managed most of the schools opened under CCA's
charters. Jennifer Coleman, State Expands Investigation of Charter School, Assoc. PRess, Aug.
9, 2004, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2oo4/o8/
09/statel852EDToo94.DTL; Molnar, supra note 32, at 27-28; see also id. at 30 (describing
instances in which for-profit management firms have "set up non-profit entities that appear
to be little more than fronts for the for-profit firm").
44. MOLNARETAL., supra note 46, at 28-29.
45. Edison Sch., Inc., Annual Report (Form io-K/A), at 19 (Sept. 30, 2003) (noting that
Edison's contractual partners typically "provide [Edison] with per-student funding
generally comparable to that received by other schools in the district and give us substantial
control over a school"); id. at 12 (noting that Edison arranges for a facility in most of the
charter schools it manages). For an example of a highly ambiguous compensation
arrangement involving another company, see Molnar, supra note 32, at 32.
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operations. 46 These companies naturally hesitate to share the details of their
management contracts with anyone other than potential investors. 47
The place that hybrid schools occupy on the for-profit-nonprofit
continuum affects how closely economic models developed to describe for-
profit firms can be applied to hybrid schools. Hybrid schools that hire for-
profit managers only for limited purposes may closely emulate pure nonprofit
schools in their economic behavior. On the other hand, hybrid schools in
which the for-profit management firms' control and incentive are powerful
enough may behave similarly to schools fully owned and operated by for-profit
entities. For example, if a for-profit management firm controls all of the day-
to-day and strategic operations of a hybrid school, 8 and the firm's
compensation turns in some way on its ability to minimize costs and maximize
revenue, a hybrid school has nearly the same incentive and capacity to lower
costs and increase revenue as a pure for-profit school. In such situations, the
management company internalizes most of the upside and downside of owning
the firm. It also enjoys most of the control, as the nonprofit charter-holding
firm is unlikely to exercise meaningful authority. Even if a non-profit board is
more than a stand-in created by the for-profit management firm to obtain the
charter, the for-profit management firm's control may be so complete that
firing it would be akin to closing the school.
In keeping with this understanding of hybrid for-profit firms, in the rest of
this Note I use the term "for-profit" to refer both to pure for-profit schools and
to hybrid schools in which the for-profit management firms' involvement is so
deep that the schools function, in economic terms, like for-profit firms.
Similarly, I count as "nonprofit schools" hybrid schools in which the for-profit
management firms' involvement is too small to distinguish the schools from
pure nonprofit schools.
Table 1 compares the number of nonprofit and for-profit schools, as I have
defined them, in the charter school market. These data, taken from annual
reports issued by Arizona State University (ASU), illustrate that nonprofits
have consistently dominated the charter school market since 1998-1999, the
first school-year for which comparative figures are available. Although for-
profits have never come close to competing with nonprofits for market
leadership, they have nonetheless maintained a presence that must be
accounted for.
46. ALEx MOLNAR ET AL., EDUC. POLICY STUDIES LAB., ARIZ. STATE UNIV., PROFILES OF FOR-
PROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT COMPANIES SEVENTH-ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, at 22-
23 (2005).
47. Molnar, supra note 32, at 31.
48. Most hybrid schools fit this description. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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Table i.
FOR-PROFIT CHARTER SCHOOL MARKET SHARE, 1998-2OO549
o.* .. ' .*," ,. . . . , .
1998-1999 928 104 11%
1999-2000 1341 128 lO%
2000-2001 1710 213 12%
2001-2002 2089 300 14%
2002-2003 2436 320 13%
2003"2004 2744 376 14%
2004-2005 3201 436 14%
There are two limitations in these data worth noting. First, the ASU report
included as for-profits only schools that were completely managed by for-
profit entities. That is, the ASU report did not consider a hybrid school to be
under for-profit management if the for-profit firm had anything less than total
control over the school's day-to-day and strategic operations. This may bias the
number of for-profit schools slightly downward, if we think a hybrid school
may act like a for-profit firm even when it's under less than total control by a
for-profit firm. Second, the report likely failed to include some hybrid schools
managed by small for-profit firms."0 For-profit companies with only one or
two schools under management tend to keep a low profile, which makes them
difficult to find and identify in a nationwide study. This biases the percentage
of charter schools downward, since it means there are hybrid charter schools
out there that the ASU study did not find. The ASU study's disproportionate
49. Total charter school numbers are taken from The Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Operational
Schools by Year Opened (2005), http://www.edreform.com/_upload/operation-year-
octo5.pdf. For-profit charter school numbers are taken from a series of annual studies done
at Arizona State University from 1998 to 2005. E.g., ALEX MOLNAR ET AL., EDUC. POLICY
STUDIES LAB., ARiz. STATE UNIV., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT
COMPANIES 1998-1999 (1999). I rely on the data from the Center for Education Reform for
total charter schools because the Department of Education relied on this data in the most
recent PCSP Report and because the data closely track the figures the Department of
Education used for earlier years in that report. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 4 exhibit
1-3. I prefer the Center for Education Reform data to the Department of Education's data
because they are more current.
5O. MOLNARET AL., supra note 46, at 22.
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failure to find small for-profit operators is primarily important for my
conclusions about for-profit firms' tendency to operate at large scales.5 '
II. EXPLAINING NONPROFIT DOMINANCE
In this Part, I argue that nonprofits dominate the charter school market
because they control agency costs more efficiently than for-profits do. In
Section A, I explain Henry Hansmann's "contract failure" theory of nonprofit
organizations, focusing on the theory's prediction that industries characterized
by high monitoring and agency costs tend to be dominated by nonprofits. In
Section B, I argue that this theory fits the charter school market because
monitoring and agency costs are high for many of the constituencies that
influence charter schools' survival. In Section C, I analyze in detail how the
constraints of the nonprofit form reduce agency and monitoring costs in
charter schools. In Section D, I consider some alternative theories to explain
nonprofit entities' dominance of the charter school market.
A. Contract Failure Theory
Although economists have yet to settle on a paradigmatic general theory of
nonprofit firms, the last two and a half decades have seen Henry Hansmann's
contract failure theory begin to prevail."2 The theory emphasizes nonprofits'
ability to reduce the inefficiencies stemming from high monitoring costs.
Hansmann explains the theory succinctly:
[N]onprofit firms serve particularly well in situations characterized by
... "contract failure" -that is, situations in which, owing either to the
51. See infra notes io8-111 and accompanying text.
52. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (198o)
[hereinafter Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise]; see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 227-45 (1996); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law]; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981). Burton Weisbrod's theory has also
received much recognition. Weisbrod has argued that nonprofits supply public goods to
individuals who demand more of the goods than the government is able to supply. In
Burton's theory, the government does not supply these goods efficiently because it is
incapable of pricing to reflect the benefits generated by the good. Burton A. Weisbrod,
Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM,
MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 173-83 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975). There are
other contenders in the field of nonprofit theory. See, e.g., A. G. Holtmann, A Theory of Non-
Profit Firms, SO ECONOMICA 439 (1983).
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nature of the service in question or to the circumstances under which it
is produced and consumed, ordinary contractual devices in themselves
do not provide consumers with adequate means for policing the
performance of producers. In such situations, the nonprofit form offers
consumers the protection of another, broader "contract" -namely, the
organization's commitment, through its nonprofit charter, to devote all
of its income to the services it was formed to provide.s3
Contract failure may occur for a variety of reasons. Consumers may be
unable to compare different producers, make a clear bargain about the nature
of the goods and the price to be paid, evaluate a product, or enforce a bargain. 4
In situations characterized by contract failure, producers can cut quality in
ways that consumers either can't perceive or to which they can't respond. For-
profit firms are particularly dangerous to consumers in these situations because
the owners of these firms benefit from whatever surplus the firms gain from
their customers' losses.
Consumers respond to this problem by turning to nonprofit firms who act
somewhat like fiduciaries on their behalf. Nonprofit firms can serve this
function because state law prohibits them from distributing profits to
shareholders.'5 These firms must plow their earnings back into their businesses
and devote themselves to serving patrons. s6 This "nondistribution constraint""
assures patrons that the firm has little incentive to take advantage of them by
reducing quality. This is important for patrons who cannot verify directly that
the firm is treating them fairly.
Hansmann offers a number of examples of nonprofit organizations that fit
this mold, such as CARE and the American Red Cross, which receive money
from donors to subsidize demand among the poor for necessities like food and
clothing. Hansmann argues that although it may seem odd, for-profit firms
could conceivably provide this same service: for example, they could provide X
pounds of rice to a person in Africa in exchange for Y dollars from a donor in
the United States. For-profit firms rarely provide this kind of service, however,
because monitoring costs are too high; a donor in the United States has almost
no way of knowing how well a firm is subsidizing demand in Africa. In the
absence of mechanisms for directly verifying a firm's performance, the donor
does the next best thing: She gives her money to a nonprofit firm that, because
53. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 52, at 506-07.
54. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 52, at 843.
55. Id. at 838.
56. HANSMANN, supra note 52, at 228.
57. Id.
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of the nondistribution constraint, has little incentive to cut quality in
unverifiable ways. ss
B. High Monitoring Costs in Charter Schools
Hansmann's theory can explain the dominance of nonprofit firms in the
charter school market. Several interest groups influence a charter school's
success and failure, including parents, government agencies, and donors.5 9
Each of these groups has goals they want the charter school to meet (generally
centering on academic achievement), and each faces significant monitoring
costs that prevent them from assessing and enforcing the school's attainment
of those goals. These groups face common monitoring problems, including
perceiving and measuring students' achievement and enforcing the threat of
accountability. Hansmann's theory explains nonprofit dominance as a product
of these groups' efforts to reduce monitoring costs. These groups prefer
nonprofits because nonprofits offer assurances that managers will not cut costs
and quality in imperceptible ways. In the following three Subsections, I explore
the monitoring costs each of these groups encounters and explain how these
groups respond to monitoring costs by encouraging nonprofit dominance.
1. Monitoring by Parents
Early charter theory placed a great deal of emphasis on parental
monitoring. Early charter theorists argued that schools would live or die based
58. Hansmann distinguishes between "donative" and "commercial" nonprofits based on their
sources of income. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 52, at 840-41.
Donative nonprofits receive income from donors who do not directly consume the goods or
services. Commercial nonprofits receive income from patrons who directly consume the
goods the firms produce. Charter schools exhibit elements of both donative and commercial
nonprofits. They are donative because governments and private donors give money to
charter schools to act as third-party intermediaries between them and the students; they are
commercial because students look a lot like paying customers, bringing and taking
government funds with them when they enter and leave.
sg. Investors, creditors, and suppliers also play important roles in determining which charter
schools succeed. I do not discuss them here, however, because their influence is unlikely to
push the charter market in either the nonprofit or for-profit direction. Investors cannot
invest in nonprofits, and there appears to be no concrete reason why creditors or suppliers
would prefer either for-profits or nonprofits. It is unlikely that monitoring costs matter to
creditors and suppliers, since they are primarily interested in charter schools' financial
health, rather than their success in educating students. Charter schools have no more ability
to obfuscate in financial matters than any other businesses do.
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on their ability to gain parents' trust.6° In fact, parents have had great difficulty
monitoring charter schools and holding them accountable. A parent's goal is
relatively simple: She wants the best education for her child. But parents face
two obstacles in monitoring schools' achievement of this basic goal: (1)
measuring and assessing output and (2) enforcing accountability once they
become dissatisfied.
The first set of problems is rooted in parents' distance from their children's
education. Parents do not sit in classrooms and receive instruction; their
children do. Parents, therefore, must resort to proxy measures of schools'
output, such as tests and conversations with students and teachers. Each of
these has severe limitations. The debate about testing is large and complex, and
it need not be rehearsed again here. It is sufficient to point out that tests do not
seek to measure many relevant character traits and values that education aims
to instill in children, such as self-discipline and cooperation. Tests are
especially problematic in assessing idiosyncratic charter schools such as
Montessori schools, which make character cultivation a central aim.6i
Additionally, test data may not be easily accessible for parents making
decisions. While parents may be able to obtain their own children's test scores,
aggregated test data is often hard to acquire. In fact, many states have had
severe problems collecting and disseminating information to parents.62
Of course, parents can also talk directly to their children and to teachers,
but these softer measures have limits as well. Teachers at for-profit schools, for
example, may be unreliable sources of information because they feel pressure to
speak optimistically to keep students from leaving. Children may also be
unreliable: They can be quizzed and questioned, but they often lack the
capacity to judge their educational experiences and to articulate those
60. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 224-25 (arguing that government agencies should
not attempt to monitor or evaluate schools on any measures of performance and should only
assure parents' access to information); FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 89.
61. See M.J. Rosanova, Montessori Elementary Is Different: What Children Study, What Children
Do, MoNTEssoRi LIFE, Spring 2003, at 8, 9; see also AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., UCLA
CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CHARTER SCHOOL REFORM 22 (1999),
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/docs/charter.pdf (describing tests' inability to measure charter
schools' success on unique curricula not oriented to tests).
62. Robert E. Crew, Jr. & Mary Ruggiero Anderson, Accountability and Performance in Charter
Schools in Florida: A Theory-Based Evaluation, 24 AM. J. EVALUATION 189, 199-200 (2003)
(observing that Florida has no central office to gather and disseminate data on charter
schools); Gregg Garn, Moving From Bureaucratic to Market Accountability: The Problem of
Imperfect Information, 37 EDUC. ADMIN. Q- 571, 591, 594-96 (2001) (observing extremely low
compliance rates with Arizona's information-gathering program); John S. Rogers, Creating
a Public Accountability for California Schools, io6 TEACHERS C. REC. 2171 (2004) (observing
the general unavailability of useful information about California education).
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judgments to parents. Finally, children's goals may conflict with their parents'.
A high school student doing poorly at a charter school may prefer to stay at the
school because her friends are there, while a parent may prefer her to leave.
A larger problem that plagues almost any method of measuring a school's
output is the risk that a child's performance depends on factors beyond a
school's control or influence. When a teenager loses interest in school, is it
because of the school or because of the teenager? Large-scale studies can
sometimes make judgments within reasonable confidence intervals about a
school's general effect on students,6" but the uncertainty is much greater when
assessing individual students. Even if a school does well on measures of
aggregate student performance, parents have little insight into whether their
own children are outliers and could do better elsewhere.
The second major monitoring obstacle is that even when parents can gather
and comprehend information, they may be in a poor position to enforce
accountability. Children become attached to teachers, friends, and routines,
and even if a school is performing worse than other available schools, the
psychological and emotional costs of removing a child may well exceed the
uncertain gains from putting her in a better school. Additionally, parents may
be vulnerable to a sunk-cost bias,6 4 irrationally keeping their children in
underperforming schools because they do not want to confront the failures of
their own judgment.
63. The challenges of comparing, on a large scale, charter school populations with their
conventional public school peers have generated a substantial literature. Numerous
researchers have noted that charter and traditional school populations differ in ways that
make statistical assessment difficult. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., AMERICA'S CHARTER SCHOOLS: RESULTS FROM THE NAEP 2003 PILOT STUDY 1, 1-9
(2004) [hereinafter NAEP REPORT] (arguing that only data that disaggregate demographic
groups are useful for comparing charter and traditional schools); PCSP EVALUATION, supra
note 31, at xiv (noting that charter schools disproportionately serve disadvantaged
populations); Crew & Anderson, supra note 62, at 206 ("The problem is that some charter
schools were created to target specific racial groups .... "); Jay P. Greene et al., Apples to
Apples: An Evaluation of Charter Schools Serving General Student Populations 6 (Ctr. for Civic
Innovation, Educ. Working Paper No. 1, 2003) (attempting to compare performance
between similar demographic groups in charter schools and traditional schools); Caroline
M. Hoxby, A Straightforward Comparison of Charter Schools and Conventional Public
Schools in the United States (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http ://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/charters-
o4o9o9.pdf (comparing students in nearly all U.S. charter schools to nearby schools with
similar racial compositions).
64. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment,
loo YALE L.J. 73, 113 (1990) (discussing sunk-cost bias in the context of summary
judgment).
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Parents may also have few alternatives. Most school choice plans are
small,6" and parents thus face a choice between one or perhaps a handful of
conventional public schools and one charter school. For parents who prefer
idiosyncratic charter schools, such as Montessori schools or schools with
particular subject emphases, the choices are particularly limited.
Hansmann's contract failure theory suggests that parents may respond to
all of these monitoring problems by preferring nonprofit schools. Though
probably unfamiliar with the nondistribution constraint, parents may
intuitively recognize their own vulnerability to being cheated and may
understand that nonprofit schools not subject to profit motives and
shareholder pressure are less likely to cheat them than for-profit schools.
Parents' preferences, in turn, influence the shape of the charter school market.
If parents don't trust a school, they can refuse to send their children there.
Since funding is tied to enrollment, schools without students go out of
business. And since parents have reason to prefer nonprofits, it is not
surprising that nonprofits dominate the charter school market.
2. Monitoring by Governments
Government agencies also play an important role in determining charter
schools' success. Like parents, government agencies have great difficulty
monitoring charter schools. Hansmann's theory therefore suggests that
agencies use their influence to encourage nonprofit charters more than for-
profit charters.
Government agencies monitor charter schools for their achievement of
several goals. First, governments want children to learn the material they're
taught. Often this interest overlaps with parents' interests. Occasionally,
however, it may bring governments and parents into conflict when parents are
unable or unwilling to seek their children's best interests. Governments also
have public-good-related goals. These generally do not overlap with parents'
interests and may even conflict with them. In a democracy, education serves
public ends by molding students into good citizens capable of fulfilling their
civic responsibilities.66  Students' fulfillment of these duties benefits all
65. Frederick Hess et al., Small Districts in Big Trouble: How Four Arizona School Systems
Responded to Charter Competition, 103 TEACHPs C. REC. 11o2, 1102 (2OO1).
66. As Horace Mann famously observed, the common school reform movement of the
nineteenth century emphasized the importance of"'mak[ing] Republicans.'" LAWRENCE A.
CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 70-71 (1951). Aside
from educating children to be good citizens, schools may also serve the public good by
creating forums for public participation. See L. Elaine Halchin, And This Parent Went to
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members of society. Since good citizens do not fully internalize all of the
benefits their civic-mindedness brings to society, education is in some senses a
public good. Public-good-related interests may bring governments into conflict
with parents who prefer bizarre anti-social curricula, or (more likely) curricula
that emphasize specialized subject areas at the expense of subjects that might
transform children into better citizens.6 7 Governments also have distributional
goals, which motivate them to ensure certain norms of equal access and
compliance with disability and nondiscrimination laws.68
Governments, however, have their own limitations. First, government
agencies face many of the same output-assessment and accountability-
enforcement problems that parents do. Second, goal-definition may be more
difficult for government agencies than for parents, because agencies must
reconcile competing ideas of educational success. Third, information-gathering
problems are in many ways more complex for governments, which are far
removed from individual children and must discern broad trends and make
large-scale policy judgments. In making these judgments, governments must
rely more heavily on tests than parents do.69 Finally, agencies face obstacles to
using the limited regulatory mechanisms that charter school statutes provide to
enforce accountability. Although charter school theorists emphasize the threat
of government-mandated closure, such closures have been rare."0 Charter
schools often become deeply politically entrenched and even underperforming
Market: Education as Public Versus Private Good, in SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE REAL WORLD:
LESSONS FROM ARIZONA CHARTER SCHOOLS 19, 30, 34 (Robert Maranto et al. eds., 1999).
But see CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 31-32 (arguing that public schools alienate parents by
restricting their participation).
67. See, e.g., CAROL ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND PRIVATIZATION 9
(1996); BRIAN P. Giu ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNow AND WHAT WE
NEED To KNow ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 17 (2001); Halchin, supra note
66, at 20, 25; Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schooling a Private Business, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 695, 697-98 (199).
68. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221i(1)(G)-(H) (West 2003) (requiring lottery-based admission and
compliance with nondiscrimination laws for Public Charter Schools Program grant
eligibility).
69. See supra note 63.
70. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL CLOSURES: THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2002) (finding that only 6.7% of charter schools nationwide had been
closed by government agencies); PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 47 (finding that only
six percent of charter schools in a national sample failed to have their charters renewed after
the initial charter period expired); id. at 50 exhibit 4-8 (finding that a majority of charter
authorizers reported a high degree of difficulty closing schools).
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schools tend to gather support.7' A group of researchers who participated in a
UCLA-sponsored study of California charter schools has argued that "holding
charter schools accountable [i]s as much a political process as it [i]s an
administrative matter."72 Charter schools have fought at least as vigorously in
political and bureaucratic settings as in the market for students.
73
Government monitoring has also been hampered by a wide range of
failings that, though not inherent in charter theory, arise frequently in practice.
For example, charter schools and government agencies are often uncertain
about the scope of the government's monitoring authority.74 The most recent
study of the Public Charter School Program found that "charter school
legislation in the states has provided virtually no guidance on how authorizers
should approach account-ability processes. One charter operator in
California and his district superintendent disagreed even about whether the
charter school had to meet the district's achievement standards or could set its
own. 6 In Arizona, which has long been a leading charter school state,
researchers observed similar uncertainty.7' Such vagueness in a monitoring
agency's mandate can profoundly cripple the agency in the politicized charter
environment.
7
Monitoring agencies also frequently lack adequate resources. In fact, most
monitoring bodies have no staff specifically devoted to charter school issues at
71. Amy Stuart Wells et al., The Politics of Accountability: California School Districts and Charter
School Reform, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 325, 329-30 (2000) (finding that similarly
performing charter schools were more likely to be shut down in districts where school
boards had strong political support than in districts where school boards had weaker
support).
72. Id. at 326.
13. See Jeffrey R, Henig et al., Privatization, Politics, and Urban Services: The Political Behavior of
Charter Schools, 25 J. URB. AFF. 37 (2003).
74- Vergari, supra note 30, at 731 ("Across the states, there is a lack of clear understanding about
what charter schools are responsible for, to whom they are responsible, and when they will
be held accountable.").
75. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 35-
76. Wells et al., supra note 71, at 335.
7. Gregg A. Garn & Robert T. Stout, Closing Charters: How a Good Theory Failed in Practice, in
SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 66, at 142, 143 ("Although policy makers
[in Arizona] focused intently on dismantling the bureaucratic entanglements for charter
schools, they neglected to articulate how state agencies should deal with charter schools in a
market-based context.").
78. See Vergari, supra note 3o, at 738.
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all.79 The symptoms of this problem have included limited communication
between agencies,0 poor information gathering, and, in some states, the
failure of any agency to take responsibility for assessing charter school
performance.81 What few resources agencies devote to charter schools may
have limited effect because charter schools often fail to set clear and measurable
goals for themselves.82
The challenges government agencies face in monitoring charter schools are
evident in agencies' emphasis on indirect forms of monitoring and regulation.
Agencies tend to hold charter schools accountable primarily for failures to
comply with financial regulations, nondiscrimination regulations, and other
definite but narrow rules, rather than for shortcomings in academic
performance."' Additionally, many charter schools receive no more autonomy
79. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 38 (finding that in 2001 only approximately one-third
of authorizers had an office or staff dedicated to monitoring charter schools); Vergari, supra
note 30, at 746 (quoting an audit by the Massachusetts Inspector General finding that local
chartering agencies had insufficient resources to monitor charter schools effectively).
go. Garn & Stout, supra note 77, at 149, 151.
8i. Crew & Anderson, supra note 62, at 199-200 (finding that, although Florida's education
agency required regular financial and student performance reporting by charter schools, "no
one in Florida's educational system has taken responsibility for annual analysis and
reporting of the data that were included in these reports"). One former associate
superintendent at the Arizona Department of Education told a researcher that before the
department initiated a new information-gathering program in 1996, "'[w]e would hear
horror stories or parents would call in with these unbelievable tales of stuff, and nobody
really knew what was happening, nobody knew if the schools were delivering what they said
they would. Were they complying with their charter or not? Nobody really knew.'" Gan,
supra note 62, at 584.
82. WELLS ET AL., supra note 61, at 6; Crew & Anderson, supra note 62, at 203; Frederick M.
Hess & Robert Maranto, Letting a Thousand Flowers (and Weeds) Bloom: The Charter Story in
Arizona, in THE CHARTER SCHOOL LANDSCAPE 54, 65 (Sandra Vergari ed., 2002); Wells et al.,
supra note 71, at 334.
83. The scholarly literature is remarkably unanimous on this point. See, e.g., Bryan C. Hassel,
Balancing Acts: What Charter Schools Teach Us About Government-Nonprofit Contracting, 26
NoNPROFrr & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q 442, 452-53 (1997) (observing the existence of intense
government monitoring of regulatory compliance and weak government monitoring of
academic achievement and performance). For example, the Arizona Department of
Education (ADE) is much more likely to monitor and enforce financial and regulatory rules
than academic performance standards. See Garn, supra note 62, at 584 (quoting an ADE staff
member saying: "We did not do a programmatic audit in that we did not look at quality or
the process of education .... What we were monitoring were those things that have either
legal or statutory compliance or charter compliance, meaning that they were doing things
that either weren't in their charter, or they weren't doing things that were in their charter.
So, we looked for the compliance in state and federal statutes."); Hess & Maranto, supra
note 82, at 67 (finding that most of the nineteen charter school closings in the Arizona
program's first four years were motivated by financial and regulatory problems, and that all
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from input-based regulation than conventional public schools do, presumably
because many regulators do not trust their ability to control charters through
output-based monitoring.84 This reality contrasts with charter theory and
statutory program design. Most charter authorizers and monitoring agencies
claim to monitor academic performance."s Indeed, output-based accountability
is a central theme in the charter school movement. But academic performance
is so difficult to measure and so open to controversy that poor academic
performance has resulted in few school closings.
Hansmann's contract failure theory predicts that in response to these
monitoring difficulties government agencies will prefer dealing with nonprofit
charter schools. Though direct evidence of agencies' preference for nonprofits
is hard to find, agencies may have encouraged nonprofits in a number of ways.
Agencies determine which schools may open and how long they may operate.
In practice, the scrutiny chartering agencies apply to new charter applications
may vary widely. But when such scrutiny is meaningful, chartering agencies
may be more likely to approve nonprofit schools than for-profit schools
because the agencies may recognize the deficiencies in their own ability to
monitor. Additionally, to reduce their monitoring costs, agencies may design
and police nonstatutory regulations in ways that are unfriendly to for-profit
charter schools.
forced charter closings resulted from financial abuses). Regulatory agencies in other states
have acted similarly. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. STATE LEGISLATURE, REPORT No. o5-11, CHARTER SCHOOL
APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS ARE REASONABLE; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMATIC 10
(2005) [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT] ("Financial problems were the most frequently cited
reason for the closure of Florida charter schools .... "); PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at
49 (finding that financial problems and problems complying with regulations were the two
most frequently cited reasons for formal sanctions by authorizers, including charter school
closure, across the country); Crew & Anderson, supra note 62, at 201 (finding that among
nineteen Florida charter closures studied, only one cited academic performance as the
primary reason for closure); Wells et al., supra note 71, at 334 (noting that in California
"district officials [were] much more likely to hold charter schools accountable on fiscal
rather than academic measures").
84. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 31; UTAH FOUND., supra note 19, at 1; Wells et al., supra
note 71, at 326 ("[I]n many instances, the amount of autonomy and the degree of
accountability that charter schools experienced were often no more or less than those of the
non-charter public schools."); see also Hassel, supra note 83, at 454 (noting that compliance
with regulations occupies an inordinate amount of charter school administrators' time).
85. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 43 (finding that ninety-one percent of charter school
monitoring agencies claim to monitor student achievement on statewide performance
assessments).
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3. Monitoring by Donors
Unlike conventional public schools, some charter schools attract substantial
donations. Because donors' money plays an important role in determining
which schools succeed and which fail, donors' tendency to choose nonprofits
may also help explain the shape of the charter school market. To understand
the ways in which donors incur monitoring costs, it is important to understand
the forms donations take. Charter donors make their contributions in a wide
variety of ways. First, they contribute cash. It is difficult to pin down exactly
how much money private donors have given charter schools, but a recent U.S.
Department of Education study found that the great majority of states reported
private cash donations as sources of startup funds for charter schools.8 6
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that donations have been important to many
charter schools.8 This evidence is bolstered by the fact that many states, either
deliberately or inadvertently, give charter schools less money than conventional
public schools, making donations important.88
86. PCSPEvALUATION, supra note 31, at 16.
87. WELLS ET AL., supra note 61, at 37 (describing a charter school that received forty percent of
its funding from private donors and a school that operated in a donated building); id. at 38
(observing that every school in the study attempted to obtain grants from private
foundations, the State of California, or the business community); id. at 41 (describing a
charter leader who used his personal connections to gather grants and donations for his
school); see also POLICY & PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., A DECADE OF
PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 59 (2002) (observing that some charter authorizers helped
schools seek private donations); Telephone Interview with Dacia Toll, Dir., Amistad Acad.,
in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 5, 2005) ("Even though we raise a lot of money, it doesn't
completely close the gap between charter and regular school funding. In the context of
Connecticut charter schools, you have to raise a lot of money."). But see UTAH FOUND., supra
note 19, at 4 fig.2 (indicating that only 7.2% of Utah charter schools' total revenue from
2000 to 2002 came from private cash or in-kind donations).
88. See THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY'S NEXT FRONTIER 1
(2005), http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/charterfinance (follow "View the Complete
Report" hyperlink). Often, states underfund charter schools by giving them only the
revenues that conventional public schools receive from the state governments, but not the
revenues conventional public schools receive from local sources, such as property taxes.
Hassel, supra note 83, at 455. For example, Colorado provides charter schools with eighty
percent of the funding that traditional school students receive, and allows charter schools to
negotiate with the districts that authorize them for more money. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-30.5-112-2(a)(I), (c)(I) (West 2005). Connecticut also deliberately underfiinds charters.
Marcelo Marlow Blackburn, Accounting for Amistad Academy: The Relationship Between
Charter School Accountability and One School's Success 2S (2oo4) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Some states, such as Arizona and Massachusetts, attempt
to fund charter students and traditional school students equally. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
15-185 (Supp. 2005); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, 5 89 (Supp. 2005). But defining
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Second, donors contribute volunteer labor. Many researchers have found
that charter schools generally get more out of parents and volunteers than
traditional schools do."9 This labor may not be as useful as skilled paid labor,
and it may inefficiently distort charter schools' choices away from cash-and-
capital-intensive instructional methods (such as computers) to labor-intensive
methods (such as supervised reading and games). But volunteerism can come
in the form of valuable skilled labor as well. Amistad Academy, a highly
successful charter school in New Haven, Connecticut, for example, has on its
board several prominent community members who volunteer their
fundraising, finance, and management expertise. 9°
Finally, nonprofit charter schools often attract talented and energetic
managers and teachers who forego higher salaries in private schools or other
industries to pursue their passion for education. 91 It may seem strange to think
of these skilled workers as "donating" their labor, but the economic effect is
similar to volunteerism. The enthusiasm and skill of undercompensated
workers may well be the most significant factors driving charter school
success. 92 Amistad Academy, for example, was founded and operated by a
group of prominent community members led by Dacia Toll, a Yale Law School
graduate and Rhodes Scholar with substantial management expertise. Toll says
that were it not for the opportunity to become involved in a charter school on
her own terms, she probably would not have entered public education. 93
"equal" can be extremely difficult. School funding sources are many and varied, and they are
often conditioned on particular school characteristics, making direct comparisons unhelpful.
See UTAH FOUND., supra note 19, at 4-7.
89. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 31, at 28; POLICY & PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., supra note 87, at
20; UTAH FOUND., supra note 19, at 4; id. at 38 (describing "parental and in-kind support,"
much of it in the form of volunteer labor); Henry J. Becker et al., Parental Involvement
Contracts in California's Charter Schools: Strategy for Educational Improvement or Method of
Exclusion?, 98 TEACHERS C. REc. 511 (1997); Richmond, supra note 59, at 358-59.
go. Interview with Dacia Toll, supra note 87; see also WELLS ET AL., supra note 61, at 30
(describing a high-level district administrator who donated a large amount of time to help a
charter school begin operating).
91. This phenomenon is not unique to nonprofit charter schools. Nonprofit firms in other
industries also tend to attract workers for below-market compensation. See infra note ioi
and accompanying text.
92. Walker Richmond, Charter Accountability: Rhetoric, Results, and Ramifications, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 330, 331 (2004) ("[C]harter schools' most significant strength is not their
accountability to external actors but rather their ability to harness the shared commitment
and energies of the internal actors.").
93. Interview with Dacia Toll, supra note 87 ("We have the keys to the car. We have total
control over budget and hiring. We have everything within our power to make this a truly
great school. It would be demoralizing to get involved and have control taken out of our
hands.")
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Teachers appear to derive satisfaction from the perception that charter schools
are more flexible, collegial, and serious about success.94 As a result, these
teachers may work harder and may stay in publicly funded education longer
than they otherwise would.
Donors face many of the same monitoring problems that agencies and
parents do. Because children's achievement is so difficult to measure, and
because the risk that children's achievement is influenced by forces outside of
the schools' control is great,9 s donors may hesitate to give their money and
time to for-profits. Donors' ability to monitor may depend to some extent on
the form the donations take. Perhaps some large cash donors, important
volunteers, and underpaid employees are in better positions to monitor charter
schools than parents and agencies are. They may be able to gain something like
insider status, sitting on charters' boards or participating in their management
and decisionmaking.
Even if some donors have some ability to monitor and enforce
accountability, there are enough schools vying for these donors' money that
even small differences between for-profit and nonprofit schools in the difficulty
of monitoring may cause donors to offer their money and services to
nonprofits. If that is so, nonprofit schools gain a competitive edge by having
access to donated funds and labor. It is difficult to say exactly how strongly
donors have influenced the makeup of the charter market, for the same reasons
it is difficult to say how much donors contribute. Contract failure theory,
however, strongly suggests that donors will favor nonprofit charter schools.
C. Enforcement of the Nondistribution Constraint in Charter Schools
We now have some sense of the problems parents, agencies, and donors
face in monitoring charter schools. We also know that Hansmann's contract
failure theory suggests that these constituencies will use their influence to
encourage the growth of nonprofits as a solution to these monitoring
problems. In this Section, I turn to the question of how exactly nonprofits
solve monitoring problems. The nondistribution constraint in nonprofit
charters provides parents, governments, and donors a guarantee that the
schools will not cut quality in ways these constituencies cannot perceive to
increase shareholders' profits. In this regard charter schools are a typical
instance of the general contract failure story.
94. PAUL T. HILL ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 5
(2002); Courtney L. Malloy & Priscilla Wohlstetter, Working Conditions in Charter Schools:
What's the Appealfor Teachers?, 35 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 219 (2003).
9g. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Ordinarily, the nondistribution constraint is enforced by state attorneys
general, the IRS, or, in a small number of states, patron lawsuits. 96 This kind
of enforcement is as plausible in the charter school industry as in any other.
Nonprofit charter schools may be subject to closer policing on the
nondistribution constraint than nonprofits in other industries, though, because
charter schools are regulated heavily in other aspects of their businesses. The
nondistribution constraint may sometimes be enforced by state boards of
education or other charter regulatory agencies."' Although charter regulators
have many failings, they appear to police charter school finances relatively
well.9' These efforts may indirectly (and inadvertently) have an effect similar
to enforcement of the nondistribution constraint. In the process of auditing
charter schools and scrutinizing the way they use government funds, charter
regulators may stumble across violations of the nondistribution constraint.
Many charter closures have resulted from discoveries of the deliberate
mismanagement and indirect profit distributions that typify violations of the
nondistribution constraint in more conventional industries. 9 Sometimes
charter regulators recognize this kind of dubious conduct as a violation of state
nonprofit corporation laws and may enforce those laws directly or report
violations to state attorneys general. It is also possible that charter regulators
process violations of the nondistribution constraint as violations of charter-
school-specific financial regulations or regulations requiring charter schools to
comply with all relevant state laws. They may, for example, require particular
funds to be spent in particular ways, or may place tight limits on the way
schools use public funds. In any event, the effect is the same.
Besides inviting direct and indirect enforcement of the nondistribution
constraint, the nonprofit form may also constrain charter schools in extralegal
ways. Hansmann has argued that the social norms associated with nonprofit
enterprise may be more effective than the threat of legal sanctions in policing
96. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 52, at 6o0-13.
97. I could find no documented instance of a state attorney general enforcement action against a
charter school for violation of the nondistribution constraint. Such enforcement of the
nondistribution constraint is rare in all industries. Id. at 6Ol; see also Thomas L. Greaney &
Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'YL. & ETHICS 1, 1-2 (2005).
9s. As noted above, this may stem partly from an effort to compensate for regulators' inability
to directly control charters' performance on measures of student achievement. See supra note
83 and accompanying text.
99. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 70, at 6-18, 31 (detailing the reasons for 154 charter
school closures across the country and listing mismanagement separately from financial
reasons in many closures).
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the nondistribution constraint. ' ° ° A significant empirical literature has
demonstrated that workers at nonprofit firms are willing to accept lower pay
than their similarly qualified peers at for-profit firms in exchange for the extra
satisfaction that comes from working at nonprofit firms.' Since nonprofit
charter schools are often filled at least partly with teachers who believe in the
schools' missions,0 2 nonprofit charters may be less likely to take advantage of
parents' and agencies' inability to monitor than for-profit charters are.
D. Alternative Explanations for Nonprofit Dominance
Contract failure is not the only way to understand nonprofit dominance.
Several alternative explanations help to account for the makeup of the charter
school market. However, because these alternative explanations have limited
capacity to explain the charter market, contract failure appears to be the most
significant factor driving nonprofits' relative success.
The most obvious alternative explanation is state law: Most states prohibit
for-profit corporations from receiving charters. This explanation is less
promising than it initially appears because it cannot account for the
infrequency of hybrid schools in most states. Only six of the forty-one states
with charter laws statutorily prohibit hybrid schools. 3 If legal restrictions on
direct charter-holding were the only obstacle to greater for-profit presence in
the market, then hybrid schools that avert legal restrictions but functionally
approximate for-profit schools would be more common than they are.
Another possible explanation is that charter schools are simply
unprofitable. Reliable data on the profitability of charter schools is extremely
difficult to find, so it is hard to assess the premise of this explanation
direcdy.1 °4 But such data would illuminate little."as It goes almost without
ioo. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 52, at 875.
lol. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND? ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS 76-78 (2004); Anne E. Preston, The Nonprofit Worker in a For-
Profit World, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 438 (1989); Burton A. Weisbrod, Nonprofit and Proprietary
Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials Among Lawyers, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 246 (1983). But see Myron
J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and
Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 750, 754 (1999) (arguing that the existing empirical
literature may overstate wage differences between nonprofit and for-profit workers because
studies fail to control adequately for less stressful and demanding work environments at
nonprofit firms).
1o2. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
103. EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STATES, supra note 32, at 4 tbl.3.
1o4. MOLNARET AL., supra note 46, at 5.
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saying that it's hard to turn a profit in for-profit charter schools. If it weren't,
there would be more such schools. The real question, then, is not whether for-
profit charters are unprofitable, it's why. The contract failure theory I have
espoused allows us to move beyond the somewhat tautological observation that
for-profits are not particularly profitable and begin to understand the reasons
why this is so.
A related explanation is that charter schools are unprofitable because their
revenues are fixed. The amount of money that follows each child to a charter
school remains static, no matter how much the school spends on its operations.
For-profits cannot make money, the argument goes, because they cannot
charge enough. This argument has the same problem that the general
unprofitability argument does: It fails to explain why nonprofits are capable of
operating with fixed revenues while for-profits are not. More important,
pricing is a function of both quality and revenue. Even if revenues are fixed,
for-profit schools can simulate price increases by lowering quality. As long as
revenues exceed costs, profits are possible, regardless of whether revenues are
fixed. Imagine, for example, a for-profit school situated in a neighborhood
where the conventional public schools are so bad that the for-profit school can
attract a large student body merely by putting a roof on the building. ,6 Such a
school could easily turn a profit by running a bare-bones operation just slightly
better than the local conventional public school.
It is possible that, given fixed revenues, the return to capital on even bare-
bones for-profit charter schools is simply too low for investors. One of the
major differences between for-profits and nonprofits is that for-profits need to
compete not only with other charter schools but also with other investment
opportunities, and for-profit schools may be unable to match these
opportunities with fixed revenues. Fixed revenues need not supplant contract
failure as the major explanation of nonprofit dominance, however. Fixed
revenues are problematic only if costs are high. And contract failure theory
helps to explain high costs with reference to the challenges of overcoming the
skepticism of parents, regulators, and donors.
ios. This isn't entirely true. If for-profit charters turned out to be tremendously profitable, then
we might think that barriers to entry or some other market imperfection was responsible for
the scarcity of for-profits.
106. The Las Vegas Sun describes one such possible situation in my home school district in rural
Nevada: "[T]he [local public high] school is marred by physical anomalies. Classrooms the
size of one-car garages. A sieve-like roof over one building that doesn't so much keep out the
rain as strain it. Fissures that fan out like spilled ink across the exterior walls of the main
building." Martin Kuz, Rural Schools Are Crumbling, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 25, 1999,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbinstories/sun/1999/apr/25/5o8711174.html.
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III. EXPLAINING FOR-PROFIT EXISTENCE
Given that monitoring costs in for-profit charters are so high, it seems
strange that any parents, agencies, or donors would prefer for-profits. Since
nonprofits control agency costs more efficiently than for-profits do, why do
for-profits exist at all? The answer lies in for-profit schools' superior ability to
raise capital and to exploit economies of scale.
There is ample evidence to suggest that most for-profit charter schools
operate at a larger scale than nonprofit schools do. Scale in schools can be
measured both in individual school size and in school network size.'0 7 The
available evidence indicates that for-profit charter schools are larger than
nonprofits along both dimensions. Heath Brown recently measured and
compared for-profit and nonprofit charter school scale on both dimensions in a
four-state survey. Brown found that for-profit charters tend to operate larger
individual schools and to centralize administrative functions into network
offices at a higher rate than nonprofit charters do.1" 8 Other evidence supports
Brown's finding on network size. The ASU study surveyed 436 for-profit
charter schools across the country in 2004-2006 and found that 336-about
seventy-seven percent-were operated by firms that had networks of ten or
more schools. 09 The data in the ASU report must be taken with a grain of salt,
since they probably omit a disproportionate number of small for-profit
operators. But data from a more detailed report on Michigan charter schools
also support this story. " ' In 1999-2000 in Michigan, 24 of the 122 for-profit
schools were operated by firms that controlled one or two schools, 36 were
operated by firms with three to six schools and 62 were operated by firms with
more than six schools. Three firms together operated a total of 55 schools. The
ASU report also supports Brown's findings on individual school size. The ASU
authors found a strong tendency among management companies with large
networks to operate individual schools larger than the national charter school
average. " '
For-profit schools' ability to run large networks stems largely from their
superior access to capital, the most essential ingredient in economies of scale.
107. For a detailed discussion of the various methods of measuring scale in schools, see Craig
Howley, Small Schools, in SCHOOL REFORM PROPOSALS: THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE § 3.2-3.5
(Alex Molnar ed., 2002).
lo8. Heath Brown et al., Scale of Operations and Locus of Control in Market- Versus Mission-
Oriented Charter Schools, 85 Soc. ScI. Q 1035, 1042-44 (2004).
log. MOLNARETAL., supra note 46, at 3, 13 tbl.2.
11o. HORN & MIRON, supra note 39, at 45.
Ill. MOLNAR ET AL., supra note 46, at i5 tbl.4, i6 tbl. 5.
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For-profits do not have to rely on the kindness of individual donors, but can
turn instead to the more tried and true methods of the profit motive and
securities markets. It is difficult to say exactly how for-profit schools go about
finding investors, or who these investors are, because the great majority of for-
profit charter management companies are privately held, and therefore do not
file periodic reports with the SEC." 2
The experience of Edison Schools is perhaps illustrative, if unusually
dramatic. During its early stages, Edison Schools raised hundreds of millions
of dollars from investors in private transactions (the precise amount is
unclear)," ' and notified the SEC that it would attempt to raise about $15o
million in its initial public offering in 1999 . ,14 The company eventually reached
a total market capitalization of more than $700 million. "5 A private equity firm
purchased the company in late 2003 for around $ioo million.n 6 There do not
appear to be any nonprofit charters that have raised anywhere near as much
money as Edison.
Using capital to run large-scale operations makes some for-profit charters
competitive with conventional public schools and nonprofit charters. In these
cases, the inefficiencies of monitoring and the efficiencies of scale interact to
produce an equilibrium between for-profit presence and nonprofit dominance
at which the advantages of scale make some parents, governments, and donors
indifferent between nonprofit schools offering low monitoring costs and for-
profit schools offering high monitoring costs along with the benefits of scale.
Since the equilibrium point we observe currently involves only a fourteen
percent market share for for-profit schools, we may deduce that the efficiencies
of scale in for-profits are small relative to the inefficiencies of high monitoring
costs.
We can make this abstract discussion more concrete with a simple example.
Imagine a parent whose son wants to play high school football. The parent is
contemplating sending her son to a small nonprofit charter high school. If only
a handful of boys are interested in playing football, or if the school is unable to
afford a football field because it cannot spread the cost sufficiently across its
small student body, then the school won't be able to field a team. If the
parent's choice is between this nonprofit charter school and a for-profit charter
112. Id. at 5.
113. Arizona State University, Chronology of Edison Project Funding, http://www.asu.edu/
educ/epsl/EPRU/documents/edison.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
14i. Edison Sch., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-i/A), at 2 (Oct. 19, 1999).
11s. William C. Symonds, Industry Outlook 2000, Services: Education, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. lo,
2000, http ://www.businessweek.com/2ooo/oo-o2/b3663149.htm.
116. Edison Sch., Inc., Transaction Statement (Schedule 13e-3) (Oct. 3, 2003).
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school of similar size, she'll send her son to the nonprofit school, because of the
risk that the for-profit school will imperceptibly cut quality to benefit
shareholders. If, however, the for-profit school enrolls enough students to field
a football team and is able to build a field, the parent might rationally run the
risk of sending her son to the for-profit school to take advantage of the football
team.
As this example demonstrates, there are many potential economies of scale
in education, both on the individual school and network levels. Large
individual schools experience economies of scale because they can spread fixed
costs - such as football fields, administrators, libraries, classrooms, driver's
education practice ranges, and cafeteria equipment- across many students.
They accomplish this by using these resources intensely. A school with only 30
students, for example, may require access to 5ooo library books to cover the
full range of subjects necessary for a complete education but will use these
books very lightly. A school with 500 students may require the same number of
books to cover the same topics, but may use these books much more frequently
without seriously diminishing their value to each student. Large schools may
also allow more subject specialization among teachers.
Large school networks experience similar economies of scale. For example,
they allow managers to centralize decisionmaking, eliminating the need for
each school's principal to invest time in becoming fully informed and weighing
the options for every decision facing the school. Networks can also centralize
data collection, reporting, and accounting, which may become major burdens
for small schools. Brown's study observes strong tendencies in for-profit
charter networks to centralize these kinds of functions."7 Additionally,
networked schools can centralize purchasing, perhaps obtaining volume
discounts from suppliers. Finally, large networks diversify risk and provide
additional security for creditors. If one school in the network has a bad year
financially, another may have a good year, and one school may be used to
secure loans to open another.
There is undoubtedly a tension between the efficiencies gained from scale
and the harmful effects of large schools on achievement. Large classrooms or
perhaps even large schools arguably hurt achievement." 8 Indeed, one of the
more subtle goals of charter policy is to reduce school size. How for-profit
schools balance this concern against the advantages of scale is not clear. It
appears, however, that the benefits of scale are sufficiendy large to create spots
for at least a significant minority of for-profit schools.
117. Brown et al., supra note io8, at 1042-44.
iu. Valerie E. Lee & Julia B. Smith, Effects of High School Restructuring and Size on Early Gains in
Achievement and Engagement, 68 SOC. EDUC. 241 (1995).
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND THE GOALS OF CHARTER SCHOOL
POLICY
Besides telling us how charter school operators choose between for-profit
and nonprofit forms, agency costs theory can also tell us how charter schools'
choice of form affects the schools' abilities to achieve some of the more
complicated goals of charter school policy. Charter advocates have cited a wide
variety of possible advantages and efficiencies in support of charter schools,119
including the attraction of additional resources; circumvention of costly
regulations and commitments such as union contracts; desegregation;
improved opportunities for parents and teachers to participate in school
governance; and a variety of benefits that stem from output- rather than input-
based accountability (such as efficient input use, satisfaction of parents'
preferences for idiosyncratic curricula, and greater experimentation and
innovation).
In this Part, I will consider the way that charter schools' choices of
organizational form impacts three of these policy goals: resource attraction,
parent and teacher participation in governance, and the benefits that stem from
output-based accountability. I focus only on these three goals because there is
no reason to believe that for-profit and nonprofit charter schools differ
meaningfully in their abilities to achieve the other goals I have described. This
is true, specifically, with regard to desegregation and circumvention of costly
regulations and commitments. Both for-profit and nonprofit forms have
advantages, and whether a state should favor for-profits or nonprofits may
depend at least partly on the state's needs. In most states, nonprofits probably
better serve the complex ends of charter school policy.
A. Resource Attraction
One goal of charter policy is to attract resources that otherwise may never
enter the public education system. Nonprofits and for-profits differ
significantly in the types of additional resources they attract. For-profits tend
to attract private capital and investment. 2 ' Unlike nonprofit schools and
conventional public schools, for-profits are capable of going into private
securities markets to offer equity shares in schools. For-profit schools may also
be capable of obtaining innovative forms of debt financing that nonprofit and
119. See, e.g., Amy Stuart Wells et al., Underlying Policy Assumptions of Charter School Reform: The
Multiple Meanings of a Movement, ioo TEACHERS C. REC. 513 (1999).
120. See supra notes 112-116.
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conventional public schools cannot obtain. Nonprofit schools, in contrast,
attract donations. As noted above, these donations may come in the forms of
volunteer labor, undercompensated employee labor, or cash.' 2 '
On balance, policymakers will find the resources attracted by nonprofit
schools most helpful. There may be instances in which private for-profit firms'
capital-raising abilities may be useful. If for some reason a district is short of
capital -enrollment is growing rapidly, for example, or the district cannot get
voter approval for its bond initiative-the possibility of authorizing hybrid
charter schools to build new schools with private financing may be attractive."
But these instances are rare. Many conventional public school districts have
good credit and can obtain funds through low-cost or even tax-preferred
bonds. Authorizing for-profit charter schools to issue securities at rates that
reflect inferior tax status and the risks associated with an immature industry
seems a rather roundabout way of dealing with capital shortages. On balance,
therefore, nonprofit schools probably attract more useful resources to public
education than for-profit and hybrid schools do.
B. Localized Governance
Many charter school advocates have argued for charter schools as an
antidote to large-scale operations and as a way of empowering local teachers
and parents to become involved in school governance. 2 ' In spite of their
efficiency in reducing costs, large schools and large networks of schools have
been said to cause a variety of ills. Large schools may alienate and disorient
students, and large, centralized networks may remove authority for crucial
decisions like curriculum design from those best positioned to make them.
Centralized governance may also discourage parents from participating and
volunteering in their schools. Some charter advocates have argued that charter
schools may be a solution to this problem if they can reduce school size and
encourage parents and teachers to reengage in the governance of their schools.
For-profit charters clearly are not as effective as nonprofit charters at achieving
this goal. As noted above, for-profit schools' most viable business model is to
121. See supra Subsection II.B.3.
122. I am grateful to Fadi Hanna for this point.
123. See Brown et al., supra note 1o8, at 1035-38 (citing research critical of large schools and
discussing support for charter schools as a method of reducing school size and increasing
parent and teacher participation in governance); see also RAY BUDDE, EDUCATION BY
CHARTER: RESTRUCTURING SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1988) (offering one of the earliest
arguments for charter schools on the ground that decentralized governance structures would
foster innovation and enthusiasm among teachers and parents).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
operate larger networks and larger individual schools than nonprofits do and to
centralize decisionmaking. Even for-profit charters, however, tend to run
smaller individual schools than conventional public schools.2
4
C. Output-Based Accountability
Many charter school theorists have pointed to a variety of benefits that may
derive from charter schools' accountability for outputs rather than inputs. The
value created by output-based accountability may take a variety of forms. For
example, market pressure may push charter schools to satisfy idiosyncratic
parent and student preferences for particular novel curricula. The National
Study of Charter Schools found that "the primary reason for founding charters
was to realize an alternative vision for schooling."' 2 These idiosyncratic
curricula improve efficiency by allowing parents and students who prefer these
curricula over more traditional methods to derive more satisfaction from the
same level of government spending. Even if distinctive curricula do not
improve students' performance on standardized tests, they make parents and
students happier and more satisfied with schools.
Another possible benefit is the incentive introduced by market competition
to use inputs efficiently. Milton Friedman provided the first forceful
articulation of these benefits in 1955,26 and numerous other proponents of
school choice have since made similar arguments. 127 John Chubb and Terry
Moe argue that choice forces inefficient schools to close and allows efficient
schools to thrive through "natural selection.""28 Before the No Child Left
Behind Act (and perhaps even now) conventional public schools may have had
inadequate incentives to hire capable teachers, for example, because the
i. MOLNARETAL.,supra note 46, at 18 tbl.7.
125. OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., NATIONAL STUDY OF
CHARTER SCHOOLS, FOURTH-YEAR REPORT: THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 200o, at 42
(2000) (noting that seventy-five percent of charter schools cited "vision" as one reason for
opening); UTAH FOUND., supra note 19, at 2 (detailing a wide variety of curricula among
Utah's charter schools); Hess & Maranto, supra note 82, at 64 (finding that in Arizona,
"[c]harter operators are relatively unconstrained in determining their curricula, and there is
much variation among schools").
126. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PU3LIC
INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 85-107.
127. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education
Enter the "Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75,
129-30 (1995); Robert Maranto, The Death of One Best Way: Charter Schools as Reinventing
Government, in SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 66, at 39, 39.
128. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 32-33.
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negative consequences may not have been significant (at least in a market-
accountability sense). Ideally, market competition and the threat of charter
school closure forces more efficient input use by charter schools.
Output-based accountability may also allow charter schools to innovate
more efficiently than conventional public schools. Besides producing value by
catering to idiosyncratic preferences, '29 charter schools may produce value by
creating gains on widely agreed upon standard measures of success because
charters have both the regulatory freedom and the incentive to innovate.3
°
Though some early charter school theorists argued that regulatory freedom
alone could produce innovation and experimentation,'31 many theorists since
have rooted these arguments in the pressures that output-based accountability
produces. In Chubb and Moe's account of the benefits of charter schools, for
example, regulatory freedom improves charter schools' ability to innovate and
discover more efficient methods primarily because regulatory freedom makes
schools more responsive to market pressures.132 They argue that only schools
"unconstrained by bureaucracy" can change quickly enough to meet parents'
and students' preferences. '33
All of this is worth thinking about because there is reason to believe that
for-profit schools are slightly more responsive than nonprofit schools to the
pressures of output-based accountability. Many early nonprofit theorists
argued that in the absence of a profit motive and monitoring by interested
shareholders, nonprofits would be less responsive to market pressures. If these
theoretical predictions are true, policymakers may want to encourage for-profit
schools, rather than nonprofit schools, to take advantage of the myriad benefits
of output-based accountability.
These theoretical predictions favoring for-profits' responsiveness to
output-based pressures have not been strongly supported by empirical
research, however. In the last twenty years, the relative efficiency of for-profit
and nonprofit firms in responding to market pressures has been the subject of
an extensive empirical debate, much of it focusing on the healthcare industry.
Although some research has suggested that nonprofit firms are less likely than
for-profit firms to structure managers' pay in ways that directly incentivize
izg. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., BUDDE, supra note 123 (arguing that charters should be granted only to groups of
teachers within districts and that the primary benefit of charter schools would be the
development of new educational techniques).
131. Id.
132. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 36-37.
133. Id. at 37.
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efficient behavior,'1 and other studies have found a positive correlation
between for-profit organizational form and efficient input use,'35 this body of
research is ultimately inconclusive.'
36
V. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
Charter school theorists, as well as many state legislatures and charter
regulators, have failed to recognize the important role that organizational form
plays in charter schools. Although most states prohibit for-profit organizations
from directly holding charters, only a handfil of states acknowledge that the
means for circumventing this restriction -hybrid contracting arrangements-
are simple and widely used. 37 Charter school regulators are also seemingly
unaware of the importance the nonprofit role has played in ensuring charter
schools' success. Most charter school regulation emphasizes direct bureaucratic
and parental monitoring, even though the nonprofit form may have done as
much or more than these forms of monitoring to ensure charter schools'
efficiency. Additionally, charter school research has inadequately explored the
consequences of organizational form for some of the more complex goals of
charter school policy. Though regulators and researchers may have been aware
that for-profit schools presented some risk for abuse, there has been no serious
attempt to assess the impact of organizational form on goals such as resource
134. A recent study of hospital manager compensation found that even when it is possible to
incentivize managers to achieve, nonprofit firms are less likely than for-profit firms to do it.
Roomkin & Weisbrod, supra note ioi, at 750-51. Output-measurement problems may make
writing incentive contracts in nonprofit firms difficult. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom,
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991).
135. See, e.g., John L. Fizel & Thomas S. Nunnikhoven, Technical Efficiency of For-Profit and Non-
Profit Nursing Homes, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 429 (1992).
136. For a thorough survey of research comparing for-profit and nonprofit hospital performance,
see Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau & Stephen H. Linder, Two Decades of Research Comparing
For-Profit and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States, 84 Soc. Scl. Q. 219
(2003). Rosenau and Linder said that a majority of empirical studies of hospitals between
198o and 2003 found that nonprofit providers performed better on measures of cost. Id. at
224. For specific empirical studies that have criticized the argument that for-profit hospitals
use inputs more efficiently than nonprofit hospitals, see, for example, Tami L. Mark,
Pyschiatric Hospital Ownership and Performance: Do Nonprofit Organizations Offer Advantages
in Markets Characterized by Asymmetric Information?, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 631 (1995); and
H. Naci Mocan, Cost Functions, Efficiency, and Quality in Day Care Centers, 32 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 861 (1997), which makes inconclusive findings about the relative efficiency of
for-profit and nonprofit daycare providers.
137. Fischer, supra note 33.
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attraction, localized governance, and responsiveness to output-based
competition.
A number of policy reforms would make charter school regulation more
responsive to the problems and opportunities posed by for-profit and
nonprofit forms. First, while almost all state legislatures have already
prohibited for-profit schools from directly holding charters, those states that
have not should do so. Furthermore, legislators and agencies should close the
loopholes that allow for-profit entities to operate charter schools by signing
management contracts with nonprofit charter-holding entities. Most state
legislatures, by prohibiting for-profit entities from holding charters directly,
have made a judgment that for-profit charter schools are bad policy. My
analysis suggests that this judgment is sound except in a limited set of
circumstances. State legislatures should take their own judgment seriously by
prohibiting for-profit entities from functionally achieving charter ownership
through artful paper shuffling.
There is no reason to distinguish between direct for-profit ownership and
hybrid arrangements that functionally emulate for-profit ownership. The
nonprofit entities that contract with for-profit management firms in hybrid
schools are unlikely to meaningfully check the for-profit firms' tendency to
exploit high monitoring costs. The nonprofit boards in hybrid schools are
often controlled by the for-profit management firms. And even if the nonprofit
boards begin by bargaining at arm's length, they inevitably come to occupy
extremely weak bargaining positions after the for-profit management firms
completely take over their schools. In such instances, ending the contractual
relationship means shutting down the school entirely.
Even if the majority of state legislatures are wrong and for-profit schools
are actually good public policy, hybrid arrangements are still suboptimal. If
for-profit schools are desirable, why force them to jump through the hoop of
hybrid management structures? If state legislators seriously believe that for-
profit schools make sense, the solution is not hybrid structures, it is direct for-
profit ownership.
A prohibition on hybrid and nominally for-profit charter schools should
perhaps be tempered by a couple of exceptions. There might be an exception
for instances in which the for-profit firms are being used to remedy capital
shortages in public schools. Such an exception would be difficult to craft. It
might require, for example, a for-profit school's application to be sponsored by
a conventional public school district, or a public school district to prove to the
chartering agency that the district is facing some capital crisis for which
empowering a for-profit school is the best solution. The prohibition on hybrid
and nominally for-profit charter schools could also create an exception for
hybrid arrangements that grant for-profit companies only a small role in the
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management of schools. Such an exception might prohibit any contract
between a nonprofit charter-holding entity and a for-profit firm that grants
more than a certain percentage of the school's annual revenue to the for-profit
firm for management services.
Second, if state legislatures refuse for whatever reason to prohibit nominal
and functional for-profit control of charter schools, then state legislatures or
administrative agencies should place indirect limits on management firms'
ability to cut costs and increase profits. Charter regulators already monitor
charter school finances relatively vigorously. These regulators could also use
their administrative lawmaking authority to fashion and enforce rules limiting
the profits that even for-profit management firms can make. Alternatively,
agencies might mandate certain inputs -such as teacher or curriculum
certification - or limit the amount of money that for-profit schools may spend
for purposes other than the procurement of inputs to be used on a school's
premises or at centralized administrative offices. These kinds of regulations
cannot reproduce the culture of nonprofit organizations that Hansmann and
others have identified as being important to nonprofits' effectiveness. But they
may curb the most egregious attempts to cut quality in ways that parents and
governments cannot observe directly.
Third, legislators and regulators should, to the extent possible, close the
loopholes in existing monitoring regimes. Some of the failures of charter
school monitoring are inevitable. Tests, for example, are always limited and
they will always imperfectly match the highly complex goals of education. But
many of the monitoring failures that have produced nonprofit dominance are
the results of flaws in charter policy design and implementation, rather than
inevitable obstacles that can never be overcome. For instance, policymakers
should ensure that charter-monitoring agencies have adequate staff and
resources to gather whatever information is available and disseminate it to the
public. These agencies can consistently gather test data, financial data, and
enrollment figures, and can make these data available to the public, thereby
helping parents more effectively monitor charter schools themselves.
Finally, enforcement authority must be clearly delineated. Everyone-
regulators, operators, and parents -should clearly understand which agency
can force accountability and on what terms. Because closing a charter school
often requires agencies to overcome significant public opposition, rules
regarding achievement should be stringent, clear, and permit little opportunity
for dispute.
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CONCLUSION
My goal in this Note is not to defend charter policy against some set of
criticisms or to argue that charter schools should be enabled, funded liberally,
or otherwise encouraged. Whatever benefits charter schools may produce must
be weighed against a substantial set of costs, none of which I explore here. My
argument is simply that agency costs theory illuminates a number of
interesting questions and problems in charter school regulation, some of which
legislators would be wise to address.
This Note makes three main points. The first is descriptive: Nonprofits
have come to dominate the charter school industry because they mitigate the
agency costs that stem from parents' and governments' inability to monitor
charter schools effectively and to hold them accountable. Nonprofit schools are
able to perform this function because (i) legal restraints on profit distribution
reduce the schools' ability to exploit parents and governments' inability to
monitor, and (2) nonprofit charter schools tend to attract capable
administrators and teachers personally devoted to charter schools' missions.
For-profit firms maintain a substantial presence, however, because they can
raise capital more efficiently than nonprofit firms can. Sometimes the
efficiencies of running large-scale operations with this capital outweigh the
inefficiencies of high monitoring and agency costs.
The second point is also descriptive: Nonprofits may be slightly better than
for-profit schools at achieving some of charter school policy's more complex
goals. In particular, nonprofits may attract more valuable resources and
improve teacher and parent participation in governance.
The final point is prescriptive: Charter school regulation must more tightly
control for-profits. For most of the charter school movement's history, the
nonprofit form has compensated to a large extent for the limits of the more
direct forms of accountability that tend to consume policymakers' and
researchers' attention. Given the substantial number of for-profit charter
schools, regulators should limit hybrid for-profit-nonprofit arrangements, curb
for-profits' ability to cut quality in imperceptible ways, strengthen existing
bureaucratic monitoring regimes, and more clearly allocate authority to enforce
accountability. Organizational form has played an important role in shaping
America's charter schools. Policymakers would be wise to take it more
seriously.
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